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1  | INTRODUC TION
Technology presents a means of improving health outcomes for vast 
numbers of individuals. Whether big data, artificial intelligence, or the 
internet of things, technology holds great promise in the health space.1 
One such application is so- called ‘telemedicine’. Telemedicine can be 
traced back over a century, with telephone consultations discussed in 
The Lancet as early as 1879.2 It has historically been deployed to stream-
line healthcare delivery and reach those who would previously have 
faced obstacles to accessing services. Indeed, in low- and middle- income 
countries, telemedicine addresses health inequities by engaging those 
living in less affluent, rural communities.3 The broader classification of 
 1Ting, D. S. W., Carin, L., Dzau, V., & Wong, T. Y. (2020). Digital technology and 
COVID- 19. Nature Medicine, 26, 459– 461.
 2_____. (1879). Notes, short comments, and answers to correspondents. Lancet, 
114(2935), P819– 822.
 3Tyagi, N., Goel, S. A., & Alexander, M. (2019). Improving quality of life after spinal cord 
injury in India with telehealth. Spinal Cord Series and Cases, 5, 70.
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Abstract
Technology presents a means of improving health outcomes for vast numbers of indi-
viduals. It has historically been deployed to streamline healthcare delivery and reach 
those who would previously have faced obstacles to accessing services. It has also 
enabled improved health education and management. Telemedicine can be employed 
in everything from primary care consultations to the monitoring of chronic diseases. 
Despite recommendation by the World Health Organization, countries have been 
slow to embrace such technology in the health sector. Nonetheless, it is expected to 
become more prevalent with increased digitization. Further, amidst the COVID- 19 
pandemic, there was a rush to implement forms of telemedicine where possible to 
prevent patients breaking social distancing rules. In this paper, I present and defend 
what I term the ‘telemedical imperative’. The telemedical imperative represents a 
duty for healthcare systems to implement remote access to services where possible, 
thereby furthering the mission of equity in access to healthcare. It is intended as 
an addition to in- person services rather than a replacement. After highlighting the 
benefits of telemedicine, I provide four criteria that must be met for the telemedi-
cal imperative to arise. The first three— safety, effectiveness, and acceptability— are 
consistent and essential. The fourth adapts to the service in question and requires 
that there be no other obstacles specific to that service that cannot reasonably be 
overcome. Finally, I address several potential objections to the telemedical impera-
tive based on more general concerns around the implementation of telemedicine.
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‘telehealth’ also enables improved health education and management,4 
although here I narrow my focus to telemedicine, meaning the use of 
technology in clinician– patient interactions for the purposes of health-
care delivery. Further, I focus only on services that are already provided 
in person, for reasons that will become apparent when I later highlight 
the importance of telemedicine becoming supplementary to in- person 
provision and not a replacement for existing services.
Telemedicine can be employed in everything from primary care 
consultations5 to the monitoring of chronic diseases.6 Despite recom-
mendation by the World Health Organization,7 countries have been 
slow to embrace such technology in the health sector. Nonetheless, it 
is expected to become more prevalent with increased digitization, 
with a 2019 report from Deloitte suggesting that ‘[w]ithin the next 
five years most people’s experience of accessing healthcare is likely 
to be digital- first, primary care led’.8 Further, amidst the COVID- 19 
pandemic, there has been (and remains) a rush to implement forms of 
telemedicine where possible.9 Ting and colleagues have even high-
lighted the potential for artificial intelligence to assist in the detection 
and diagnosis of COVID- 19.10 The swift introduction of telemedicine 
in response to the pandemic was to allow the overwhelming number 
of patients requiring medical attention that could feasibly be ac-
cessed remotely to do so, removing the need for such patients to 
break social distancing rules. The pandemic has therefore inadver-
tently and informally instigated an array of large- scale trials of tele-
medicine globally— it will be important to assess these new services 
over time to determine the appropriateness of continuation when 
they are no longer essential to prevent the spread of the virus.
In this paper, I present and defend what I term the ‘telemedi-
cal imperative’ (TI). The TI represents a duty for healthcare systems 
to implement means of remote access to services where possible, 
thereby furthering the mission of equity in access to healthcare. 
Importantly, this is intended as an addition to in- person services 
rather than a replacement. After highlighting the benefits of telemed-
icine, I provide four criteria that must be met for the TI to arise. The 
first three— safety, effectiveness, and acceptability— are consistent 
and essential. The fourth is adaptive to the service in question and 
requires that there be no other obstacles specific to that service that 
cannot reasonably be overcome. Finally, I address several potential 
objections to the TI based on more general concerns around the im-
plementation of telemedicine.
2  | BENEFITS OF TELEMEDICINE
2.1 | Overcoming inequities
Many telemedical services focus on improving health outcomes for the 
most disadvantaged. In many cases this is in low- and middle- income 
countries, where services are made available in communities that pre-
viously had no or limited means of accessing them. However, it is also 
the case in wealthier economies, where procedural barriers can pre-
vent people from accessing healthcare. An early example in northern 
Norway was an initiative in the 1980s to allow citizens in rural com-
munities that lacked specialist care services to access them remotely.11 
Such systems would be especially useful in providing expertise for 
those with rare diseases (potentially across borders, although this 
would entail additional legal and regulatory considerations). Improving 
access remains necessary in almost all countries: whereas understand-
ings of being geographically distant may differ across countries, in 
most there is a portion of the population for whom reaching the near-
est health provider is neither quick nor easy. Even individuals living in 
close proximity to healthcare facilities may face obstacles in the form 
of childcare arrangements, time off work, or even anxiety in certain 
settings. Socioeconomic status is often a cause of these barriers, but 
even wealthier individuals and families may face them.
Telemedicine can contribute to overcoming these barriers and 
redress some of the socioeconomic imbalances that are closely re-
lated to health outcomes. Not only do so- called postcode lotteries12 
correlate with the urban– rural divide, it is also the case that the par-
ticular region in which a patient resides can present a challenge to 
accessing specialist care. Once implemented, telemedicine can 
‘widen the capacity’ of clinicians in various specialties,13 thereby im-
proving health outcomes in underserved areas. Not only are inequi-
ties addressed by removing these procedural barriers, but the 
financial savings that are sometimes made with the implementation 
of telemedicine can make possible an equitable redistribution of re-
sources to further improve healthcare justice. Telemedicine has 
been found to be cost- effective in various settings, including dia-
betic retinopathy screening in Singapore,14 orthopaedic consulta-
 4Conde, J. G., De, S., Hall, R. W., Johansen, E., Meglan, D., & Peng, G. C. Y. (2010). 
Telehealth innovations in health education and training. Telemedicine and e- Health, 16(1), 
103– 106.
 5Raven, M., Butler, C., & Bywood, P. (2013). Video- based telehealth in Australian primary 
health care: Current use and future potential. Australian Journal of Primary Healthcare, 
19(4), 283– 286.
 6Rohatgi, R., Ross, M. J., & Majoni, S. W. (2017). Telenephrology: Current perspectives 
and future directions. Kidney International, 92(6), 1328– 1333.
 7World Health Organization. (2010). Telemedicine: Opportunities and developments in 
member states. Geneva: WHO Press.
 8Deloitte Centre for Health Solutions. (2019). Closing the digital gap: Shaping the future of 
UK healthcare. Retrieved from https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/
Documents/life- sciences- health- care/deloitte- uk- life- sciences- health- care- closing- the- 
digital- gap.pdf
 9British Medical Association. (2020). COVID- 19: Video consultations and homeworking. 
Retrieved from https://www.bma.org.uk/advice- and- support/covid- 19/adapting- to- 
covid/covid- 19- video- consultations- and- homeworking; Wosik, J., Fudim, M., Cameron, 
B., Gellad, Z. F., Cho, A., Phinney, D., … Tcheng, J. (2020). Telehealth transformation: 
COVID- 19 and the rise of virtual care. Journal of the American Medical Informatics 
Association, 27(6), 957– 962.
 10Ting et al., op. cit. note 1.
 11Elford, D. R. (1997). Telemedicine in northern Norway. Journal of Telemedicine and 
Telecare, 3, 1– 22.
 12Stanberry, B. (2006). Legal and ethical aspects of telemedicine. Journal of Telemedicine 
and Telecare, 12, 166– 175.
 13Dickens, B., & Cook, R. (2006). Legal and ethical issues in telemedicine. International 
Journal of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, 94, 73– 78, p. 77.
 14Nguyen, H. V., Tan, G. S., Tapp, R. J., Mital, S., Ting, D. S., Wong, H. T., … Lamoureaux, E. 
L. (2016). Cost- effectiveness of a national telemedicine diabetic retinopathy screening 
program in Singapore. Opthalmology, 123(12), 2571– 2580.
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tions in Norway,15 and emergency medicine consultations in the 
United States.16 Of course, not all telemedical services will make 
clear financial sense, but where they do these savings might be redi-
rected to, for example, establishing satellite clinics or providing pa-
tients who lack the means to access telemedicine with appropriate 
technology.
There is a concern that telemedicine can perpetuate and worsen 
the digital divide (which often correlates with socioeconomic status), 
which I will address shortly. For now, I simply wish to note that tele-
medicine has the potential, if correctly implemented, to overcome 
health inequities.
2.2 | Efficiency
Waiting times for many healthcare services are long, and in some 
cases these delays can be harmful to patients. Not only might the 
health concern for which a patient is seeking medical attention 
worsen, but anxiety may increase because of delayed care.
Telemedicine has the potential to overcome these issues by 
improving efficiency. Telemedicine can improve efficiency not 
only from the provider’s side, but also from the patient’s side, 
as removing the need to travel to appointments lessens the time 
commitment for receiving care. This is especially beneficial in 
reaching those living remotely who would otherwise have to 
travel long distances. Even those who are not socioeconomically 
disadvantaged and could make these trips may well value the 
saved time.
Reduced waiting times can also improve safety.17 Patients could 
receive time- sensitive treatments earlier and reduce the risk of com-
plications. This applies to treatments that are time- sensitive both in 
the medical and in the policy sense. Take, for example, gestational 
limits on access to abortion care— the limits imposed in many coun-
tries are not founded solely on medical evidence, even though the 
termination of pregnancy is safer and more effective earlier in preg-
nancy, and telemedicine makes it easier for women to access care 
before they exceed those limits.18 Reduced waiting times also con-
tribute to disease prevention, as early signs may be noticed. In some 
cases, this could save lives.
Improved efficiency of service delivery has clear benefits across 
the board and demonstrates a need to at least consider the imple-
mentation of telemedicine where possible.
2.3 | Enhancing autonomy
Telemedicine as additional to in- person service delivery introduces a 
new option for patients. Rather than a binary choice between (in- 
person) care or no care, patients would be presented with an addi-
tional option of telemedical care. The benefits of this to patients in 
terms of control over their daily lives may range from something as 
simple as being home for a delivery to avoiding the need to risk injury 
travelling to a GP if frail. These benefits may even be considered 
empowering.19 If a patient feels that they have more control over 
their care, this may result in more positive interactions with the 
healthcare system generally. The additional choice, therefore, is 
likely to be appreciated by many even if they do, either occasionally 
or always, opt for in- person care.
Additional choices can be considered as enhancing a patient’s 
autonomy. Beauchamp and Childress write that a necessary condi-
tion of autonomy is that an agent be free of limitations that ‘prevent 
meaningful choice’.20 Assuming this procedural account, being pre-
sented with a yes/no choice in the context of medical care can be 
considered such a limitation as it is a false choice. Realistically, unless 
it is a minor ailment, few people would consider ‘no’ a genuine op-
tion. That is not to say that we should not consider consent to treat-
ment valid purely because there was only one option. Rather, to be 
presented with additional options is to further enable meaningful 
choice. Having two options within the remit of ‘yes’ actually allows a 
choice, rather than a patient agreeing to the single option under the 
guise of a choice. It is necessary to remember here that the patient 
enters the clinician– patient relationship in a state of vulnerability be-
cause they require help, so it is important for the clinician to engage 
them in a decision- making process;21 there is little process to decid-
ing whether to accept the only option available.
Interestingly, Levy22 argues that constrained choices might in fact 
enhance autonomy, proposing mildly coercive modifications to in-
formed consent that are designed to increase autonomy by guiding 
individuals towards their personal conception of the good. This rea-
soning might be taken to justify the provision of fewer choices. 
However, this is problematic when considering telemedicine as it 
would require an assumption that one option is preferable (meaning 
that it aligns with the individual preferences of all patients). Naturally, 
this is the case neither with in- person nor with telemedical care. 
Whilst some patients will prefer in- person services, others will view 
remote delivery as the best option. This does, of course, depend on 
how one interprets ‘constrained choices’. To offer four choices 
rather than six would be to constrain choices. Perhaps, then, offering 
in- person and telemedical delivery of a service can still be 
 15Buvik, A., Bergmo, T. S., Bugge, E., Smaabrekke, A., Wilsgaard, T., & Olsen, J.A. (2019). 
Cost- effectiveness of telemedicine in remote orthopedic consultations: Randomized 
controlled trial. Journal of Medical Internet Research, 21(2), e11330.
 16Nord, G., Rising, K. L., Band, R. A., Carr, B. G., & Hollander, J. E. (2019). On- demand 
synchronous audio video telemedicine visits are cost effective. American Journal of 
Emergency Medicine, 37(5), 890– 894.
 17Hjelm, N. M. (2005). Benefits and drawbacks of telemedicine. Journal of Telemedicine 
and Telecare, 11, 60– 70.
 18Romanis, E. C., Parsons, J. A., & Hodson, N. (2020). COVID- 19 and reproductive justice 
in Great Britain and the United States: Ensuring access to abortion care during a global 
pandemic. Journal of Law and the Biosciences, 7(1), lsaa027.
 19Kaplan, B., & Litewka, S. (2008). Ethical challenges of telemedicine and telehealth. 
Cambridge Quarterly in Healthcare Ethics, 17, 401– 416.
 20Beauchamp, T. L., & Childress, J. F. (2013) Principles of biomedical ethics (7th ed). New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, p. 101.
 21van Wynsberghe A., & Gastmans C. (2008) Telesurgery: An ethical appraisal. Journal of 
Medical Ethics, 34, e22.
 22Levy, N. (2014). Forced to be free? Increasing patient autonomy by constraining it. 
Journal of Medical Ethics, 40, 293– 300.
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considered a constraining of choices, as it is so relative to offering 
several in- person options (for example, travel to a clinic that is far 
away or await the next visiting clinic) and several telemedical options 
(for example, videoconferencing consultation or chatbot) simultane-
ously. Understandably, to be overwhelmed with choice might under-
mine autonomy, as the individual may decide on a basis other than 
reason. Levy is then right in some circumstances. However, the addi-
tion of a telemedical option for healthcare services is not intended to 
introduce myriad options for patients but is a simple means of avoid-
ing a false choice.
Whether or not the availability of a telemedical option actually 
enhances autonomy is a question of semantics: some might argue 
that it merely enables autonomy and that the absence of telemedi-
cine limited autonomy. However one chooses to frame it, telemed-
icine at least enhances autonomy relative to the previous standard 
of care, as to constrain an individual’s choices is to undermine their 
autonomy at least to some extent.
Notably, this benefit does rely on telemedicine being an addi-
tional option rather than a replacement for in- person services. In 
response to the COVID- 19 pandemic, for example, telemedicine has 
in some cases become a replacement and is not, therefore, enhanc-
ing autonomy. This, however, was a matter of necessity in unprece-
dented circumstances. These telemedical services may provide this 
particular benefit at a later date if they continue after the pandemic 
when there is a return to in- person services. The risk of a decline in 
the provision of in- person services— the telemedical primacy objec-
tion— is discussed shortly.
3  | THE TELEMEDIC AL IMPER ATIVE
The TI is quad- conditional (see Box 1) and provides something of a 
checklist for considering the introduction of telemedicine in the de-
livery of a given service. The first three conditions— safety, effective-
ness, and acceptability— would generally be considered important in 
discussing any intervention whether telemedical or in person. They 
are necessary in respecting myriad ethical principles concerning the 
avoidance or minimizing of harm to patients. Should a telemedical 
service fail to satisfy these three, I argue that no such imperative 
exists. The fourth takes a different form depending on the service 
in question.
3.1 | Safety
Of the three common criteria, safety is the most obvious. The impor-
tance of safety can be traced back to the Hippocratic Oath, whereby 
clinicians are duty bound not to harm their patients. This tradition 
has remained prominent in medical ethics and is now more com-
monly known as nonmaleficence.23 To suggest that an unsafe tele-
medical service be introduced is to firmly ignore this well- established 
duty, making safety an important criterion. As Derse and Miller 
argue, telemedicine ‘should not be allowed to expand access at the 
expense of creating substandard practice’.24
A simple means of confirming that the safety criterion is satisfied is 
to consider the safety of the service provided by telemedicine relative 
to that in person; a relative standard is easier to apply than an objec-
tive one as it prevents the need to consider how safe is safe enough. 
After all, the TI is intended to apply to existing services, so a relative 
standard is feasible. Take, for example, an entirely verbal consultation 
with a GP. If the nature of the patient’s concern is not physically exam-
inable, the GP provides advice based on the information the patient 
shares with them. It would be no safer for this conversation to take 
place in a surgery than on a video call, as the GP would still be able 
to ask any necessary questions and have the patient’s notes open. 
Therefore, such a consultation would easily satisfy the safety criterion.
There is a wealth of literature more specifically considering tele-
psychiatry. Freudenberg and Yellowlees provide an account of a case 
in which a patient’s quiet verbal indication of an intention to self- 
harm was not picked up by the webcam he was using, so his doctor 
missed it.25 In this case, safety was a concern. Further, it highlights 
very clearly the importance of a good- quality, stable connection. In 
the interests of safety, it would be appropriate for a clinician to bring 
a consultation to an end and either reschedule or insist on an in- 
person consultation should the connection be poor.
An interesting point here is how the standard of care might apply 
from a legal perspective.26 Would it be appropriate for the standard 
of care to be lowered when a service is delivered remotely? Examples 
such as Rudling27 suggest there are legal issues that would need ad-
dressing here. These issues vary across jurisdictions, so I will not deal 
 23Beauchamp & Childress, op. cit. note 20.
 24Derse, A. R., & Miller, T. E. (2008). Net effect: Professional and ethical challenges of 
medicine online. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, 17(4), 453– 464.
 25Freudenberg, N., & Yellowlees, P. M. (2014). Telepsychiatry as part of a comprehensive 
care plan. American Medical Association Journal of Ethics, 16(12), 964– 968.
 26Stanberry, op. cit. note 12.
 27R v Rudling [2016] EWCA Crim 741.
BOX 1 Conditions of the telemedical imperative.
• Safety: In line with the duty to ‘do no harm’, telemedical 
services must present no significant risk of harm relative 
to in- person delivery of the same service.
• Effectiveness: The effectiveness of a service provided by 
telemedicine must be similar to that of the same service 
provided in person.
• Acceptability: Patients must consider telemedical deliv-
ery of a service acceptable, although it need not be a 
majority.
• No service- specific concerns: In addition to the three gen-
eral criteria, there must be no significant concerns that 
are specific to the service in question that cannot satis-
factorily be overcome.
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with them extensively in this paper. Nonetheless, it is important to 
consider the question of whether care of a lower quality would be 
acceptable if it were to provide the benefits of telemedicine already 
outlined. Derse and Miller raise this question and suggest that qual-
ity care is a non- waivable obligation.28 Given the importance of pre-
venting undue harm to patients, I too suggest that the same standard 
ought to apply. Introducing telemedical services that are of lower 
quality would be to take one step forward and two steps back. 
However, the mantra of something is better than nothing might 
apply in certain, very limited, circumstances. Chaet and colleagues 
note the importance of considering what access a person might oth-
erwise have to health care, citing examples such as a submarine crew 
and astronauts in space.29 In such extreme cases, it would be appro-
priate for telemedical services to be used even if the standard of care 
is lowered as a result. Certainly, the United States' National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has long been a lead-
ing force in the development of telemedicine.30 In ‘normal’ medical 
practice, however, this is not in keeping with the duty of clinicians to 
put patient welfare first.
3.2 | Effectiveness
This second condition also partially concerns the avoidance of harm. 
If a telemedical service is ineffective— or less effective than that ser-
vice delivered in person— the patient may be harmed. In that sense, 
the physical harm that may result from an ineffective telemedical 
service would also fall under the safety criterion. Effectiveness, 
however, goes further; a service may be safe but ineffective.
In many cases, the telemedical and in- person delivery of a service 
will be comparably effective. A Cochrane Review found similar out-
comes in conditions such as heart failure, as well as some evidence of 
improved quality of life with telemedicine.31 Another example is diabe-
tes, which needs regular monitoring. Hjelm discusses diabetic patients 
taking their own blood glucose measurements whilst on a video call 
with a laboratory technician.32 This allows the results to be verified and 
removes the need for regular in- person consultations. However, other 
conditions may not be as effectively managed remotely. Certain respi-
ratory check- ups, for example, may be unsuited to telemedicine. The 
control of asthma and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease requires 
the assessment of inhaler technique, which would be difficult on a 
video call, especially if the connection is less than perfect.
In some cases, the effective use of telemedicine may improve the 
effectiveness of other aspects of a patient’s care. Ossemane and col-
leagues discuss two SMS interventions in Mozambique that work to 
improve the retention of HIV+ patients in treatment.33 Interestingly, 
given that telemedicine is often implemented to reach those in rural 
areas, one of these interventions found success in urban patients but 
not rural patients.34
It must be noted, however, that just because a telemedical ser-
vice is effective in general it is not necessarily effective in all situa-
tions. Clinical discretion is required in the telemedical provision of 
services that do, in principle, satisfy the criteria of the TI; it is for 
clinicians to decide on a case- by- case basis and, where they deem it 
necessary, insist on in- person services for certain patients. As right-
fully noted by Chaet and colleagues (on behalf of the American 
Medical Association’s Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs), tele-
medicine is not appropriate in circumstances in which it prevents 
clinicians meeting established clinical standards.35 Policy can be re-
sponsible for wider decisions about the suitability of telemedicine 
for certain services, but individual decisions must ultimately come 
down to clinical judgement in the context of each patient; if a clini-
cian feels that clinical standards will not be met using telemedicine 
with a patient, not only would it be acceptable to insist on in- person 
delivery but it would be ethically required to prevent unnecessary 
harm. As Sabin and Skimming argue, it is important that services de-
livered by telemedicine maintain the same standards of ethics and 
professionalism as expected of in- person services.36 Just as a patient 
cannot demand a treatment in person that their clinician does not 
consider appropriate, they cannot demand telemedical services 
either.
The effectiveness criterion is also about justice. If a service is inef-
fective when provided through telemedicine, that patient may require 
further medical attention in person— either the same service again, or 
further services due to a worsened condition. In such a situation, the 
use of telemedicine has not only resulted in unnecessary hassle for 
those involved, but also a greater use of resources, thereby risking an 
eventual increase in health inequities and a subsequent undermining 
of one of the key benefits of telemedicine. As such, the effectiveness 
criterion may also enable an economic case to be made where systems 
are well established, with IT systems of appropriate quality.
 28Derse & Miller, op. cit. note 24, p. 458.
 29Chaet, D., Clearfield, R., Sabin, J. E., & Skimming, K. (2017). Ethical practice in 
telehealth and telemedicine. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 32(10), 1136– 1140, p. 
1137.
 30Nicogossian, A. E., Pober, D. F., & Roy, S. A. (2001) Evolution of telemedicine in the 
space program and Earth applications. Telemedicine Journal and e- Health, 7(1), 1– 15.
 31Flodgren, G., Rachas, A., Farmer, A. J., & Inzitari, M. (2015). Interactive telemedicine: 
Effects on professional practice and health care outcomes. Cochrane Database of 
Systematic Reviews, 9, CD002098.
 32Hjelm, op. cit. note 17.
 33Ossemane, E. B., Moon, T. D., Were, M. C., & Heitman, E. (2017). Ethical issues in the 
use of SMS messaging in HIV care and treatment in low- and middle- income countries: 
Case examples from Mozambique. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 
25(4), 423– 427.
 34Joseph Davey, D., Nhavoto, J. A., Augusto, O., Ponce, W., Traca, D., Nguimfack, A., & 
Palha de Sousa, C. (2016). SMSaúde: Evaluating mobile phone text reminders to improve 
retention in HIV care for patients on antiretroviral therapy in Mozambique. Journal of 
Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 73(2), e23– e30.
 35Chaet et al., op. cit. note 29, p. 1137.
 36Sabin J. E., & Skimming, K. (2015). A framework of ethics for telepsychiatry practice. 
International Review of Psychiatry, 27(6), 490– 495, p. 494.
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3.3 | Acceptability
The third point to consider is how acceptable telemedical provision 
of a service is to patients. Again, the avoidance of harm partially 
guides this criterion, although this time it is a matter of potential 
psychological harm.
Acceptability is not only about tolerance of the physiological as-
pect of the service. In some circumstances, patient concerns about 
security may compromise acceptability. Some may worry that a tele-
phone or video call may not be secure, or that a family member in 
the patient’s home will overhear personal information. Telemedical 
delivery of a service to such patients may cause unnecessary dis-
tress. This is most likely to be the case for especially sensitive issues 
or for patients with pre- existing mental health conditions, but may 
be the case for others. However, it is necessary to note here that 
the reverse will also be true. Some patients may find GP or hospi-
tal waiting rooms distressing environments, thereby reaffirming the 
benefit of choice.
Concerns over acceptability may also arise in the case of in-
forming relatives of a patient’s death and whether a video call, for 
example, is appropriate to try and console relatives. van 
Wynsberghe and Gastmans question whether consolation via 
computer would be done if the option of in person were avail-
able.37 The importance of communication to the clinician– patient 
(and, indeed, clinician– relative) relationship will be discussed 
shortly.
The extent of acceptability need not be overwhelming. A telemed-
ical service that is preferred by a sizeable minority would satisfy the 
condition. Of course, if this were the case it would be important to 
make patients aware of the range of views, thereby providing appro-
priate information to allow them to decide if it is something that they 
might find acceptable. It is not reasonable to provide an exhaustive list 
of relative harms and information on acceptability, so a similar stan-
dard to in- person care could be applied. For example, the test of mate-
riality from the case of Montgomery,38 which requires that the clinician 
inform the patient of risks to which a reasonable person in the pa-
tient’s position would likely attach significance. It is because accept-
ability is a subjective question that the telemedical delivery of a service 
ought not to become the only— or even the default— option. Further, 
even if a patient finds the telemedical delivery of a service acceptable, 
that same patient may still prefer the in- person equivalent.39
An important role of the acceptability criterion is to ensure that 
compassion is accounted for. Certain elements of care may be 
feasible remotely (and would be safe and effective) but still should 
rather clearly be delivered in person. An example is provided by 
Humbryd, drawn from an article in the New York Times.40 A patient, 
in a room with his family, was informed that he had incurable lung 
disease by a doctor he did not know via video link. Humbryd per-
fectly captures what is evident in this case— that the hospital was 
‘ultimately choosing efficiency over compassion’.41
Cases like the one above demonstrate that telemedicine is not 
always appropriate. Just because it ‘works’, it does not mean that we 
should do it. It is reasonable to presume that most patients would 
not find receiving such information through telemedicine accept-
able. Whilst there may be exceptions in some cases, compassion 
dictates that conversations informing patients that there is no more 
that can be done and/or that they have a very poor prognosis should 
take place in person. It is for this reason that safety and effective-
ness alone do not make suitable criteria.
3.4 | No service- specific concerns
The fourth and final condition of the TI is rather more vague and its 
nature will differ between services. In essence, the criterion of no 
service- specific concerns acts as a catch- all to note that, in some 
circumstances, the fact that a telemedical service is safe, effective, 
and acceptable may not be reason enough to introduce it.
For example, in some circumstances the burden on carers/co-
habitants may be significant enough to bring into question how eth-
ical the use of telemedicine is. Bauer raises a concern that where 
complex medical equipment is placed in a patient’s home and mon-
itored remotely, the home may become a ‘de facto ICU’ and place 
significant burden on the patient’s family.42 This would necessitate, 
argues Bauer, a family- centred approach rather than the current 
standard patient- centred approach to care decisions; it would be 
important to consider the impact on those living with the patient. 
Therefore, even if the placement of remotely monitored intensive 
care equipment in the home were to be safe, effective, and accept-
able to the patient, the significant burden on others who are di-
rectly affected may cause it to fall short of this final criterion.
This example demonstrates the importance of service- specific 
considerations as a final condition to the TI. Concerns about those 
close to the patient being burdened are not significant in many appli-
cations of telemedicine, such as online GP consultations and check- 
ins with a specialist. The concern raised by Bauer is niche and seems 
only to apply to the uncommon circumstances of at- home intensive 
care. It is for that reason that ‘burden to carers’ would not be an ap-
propriate criterion in itself but can be encapsulated by this catch- all 
when relevant.
 37van Wynsberghe, A., & Gasmans, C. (2009). Telepsychiatry and the meaning of 
in- person contact: A preliminary ethics appraisal. Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 
12, 469– 476, p. 473.
 38Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11.
 39Collins, K., Nicolson, P., & Bowns, I. (2000). Patient satisfaction in telemedicine. Health 
Informatics Journal, 6, 81– 85; Chaet et al., op. cit. note 29, p. 1137.
 40Humbyrd, C. S. (2019). Virtue ethics in a value- driven world: Ethical telemedicine. 
Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research, 477(12), 2639– 2641, p. 2639.
 41Ibid.
 42Bauer, K. A. (2001). Home- based telemedicine: A survey of ethical issues. Cambridge 
Quarterly in Healthcare Ethics, 10, 137– 146, p. 141.
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By no means is this the only example. Myriad considerations 
may be dealt with as part of this fourth criterion. For example, legal 
concerns, resource constraints, and even the possibility of moral 
distress to clinicians. These are all important points but are not uni-
versally applicable; some telemedical services will be clearly within 
the requirements of legislation, cost- saving, and pose no risk of 
moral distress.
One might contend that a catch- all condition ignores the range of 
ethical questions raised by new telemedical services. However, its 
intention is quite the reverse. This fourth criterion serves to broaden 
the applicability of the TI. As with the de facto ICU example, many 
ethical concerns about specific telemedical services are somewhat 
unique to that service. This catch- all acts to air these concerns with-
out burdening consideration of all telemedical services with a range 
of unrelated ethical qualms. It can be adapted to meet the needs of 
the intervention in question, much like the process of specification 
that Beauchamp and Childress detail for the practical use of their 
four principles.43
4  | SOME POTENTIAL OBJEC TIONS
4.1 | Telemedical primacy
The first objection I will consider is the possibility of a decline in in- 
person services following the pursuit of the TI, and I will refer to it as 
the telemedical primacy objection.
One might worry that with a shift towards telemedicine, a grad-
ual reduction in the availability of in- person services may ensue. This 
response is understandable given how the digital age has caused a 
decline in other physical services— consider the impact of online 
shopping on the high street. Physical services are not always neces-
sary and might only have been in person previously out of necessity 
(i.e., prior to widespread internet access). This, I suggest, is not the 
case in medicine.
Given this concern, it is important to stress that the TI does 
not entail the positioning of telemedical provision as the automatic 
mode of service delivery. Having demonstrated the myriad bene-
fits of telemedicine, the question naturally arises as to whether it 
should be the default. If we allow repeat prescriptions to be ob-
tained over the phone, should it only be on special request that a 
patient be allowed an in- person consultation with their clinician 
to obtain one?
Duffy and Lee44 consider it a means of commitment to patient- 
centred care to make in- person services ‘Option B’. The ability of 
telemedicine to put a patient’s care at their fingertips, they argue, 
can improve the experience and streamline the whole system. 
However, this position contradicts one of the key benefits of tele-
medicine discussed earlier: its ability to enhance patient autonomy 
by offering choice. To make telemedicine the default not only in-
creases the risk of it eventually becoming the only option but is likely 
to pressure patients into opting for it, thereby preventing meaning-
ful choice. There are countless reasons why some patients would 
prefer to speak to a clinician face- to- face: elderly patients may not 
have internet at home; victims of domestic abuse may fear their 
abuser overhearing; and some patients may be anxious about the 
extent to which the means of communication are secure even after 
being reassured. To pressure such patients into video consultations 
and other telemedical services risks causing unnecessary anxiety. 
Instead, in- person and telemedical options should be on an equal 
footing and both be offered to patients, allowing individual patients 
to decide which is preferable for them.
The TI seeks to improve healthcare— with particular attention to 
overcoming inequities— and to progress to a situation where only 
care that cannot be delivered through telemedicine is delivered in 
person does not further that goal. By introducing telemedicine as an 
additional service rather than the default, the risk of its becoming the 
only option is at least minimized. Certainly, this echoes the thoughts 
of hospice staff in a qualitative study about telehospice; whilst being 
positive overall about the use of telemedicine, there was a concern 
among several participants that it could interfere with in- person ser-
vices, resulting in the view that telemedicine should only be an addi-
tional option.45 As such, it is appropriate for clinicians to make 
patients aware of the option for telemedicine and to highlight its 
benefits. This must be done, however, as objectively as possible in 
order to avoid backtracking to paternalism, otherwise the benefit of 
enhanced autonomy is problematized.
4.2 | Digital exclusion
A second objection, and one which naturally follows from the issue 
of telemedical primacy, is that of digital exclusion. There is a concern 
that some might be left behind owing to poor tech literacy or eco-
nomic disadvantage if there is a push to implement telemedicine as 
much as possible.
This provides further justification for telemedicine being sup-
plementary only. The removal of in- person services in the push for 
telemedicine would perpetuate the digital divide that already exists 
in various areas of society. As a result, not only would the benefit of 
enhanced autonomy be lost, but the implementation of telemedicine 
would fail to further the goal of reducing inequity by simply shifting 
the access burden to a different population group.
Telemedicine being supplementary only, then, affords a benefit to 
those who can and choose to embrace it, whilst maintaining existing 
in- person services prevents the care of those who neither can nor want 
to make use of telemedicine being worsened. Further, in developed 
countries at least, most people have internet access. For example, the 
 43Beauchamp & Childress, op. cit. note 20, p. 17.
 44Duffy, S., & Lee, T. H. (2018). In- person health care as option B. New England Journal of 
Medicine, 378, 104– 106.
 45Demiris, G., Parker Oliver, D. R., Fleming, D. A., & Edison, K. (2004). Hospice staff 
attitudes towards telehospice. American Journal of Hospice & Palliative Medicine, 21(5), 
343– 347, p. 346.
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Office for National Statistics reported that in 2019 93% of households 
in Great Britain had internet access.46 Depending on context, it may be 
appropriate for those who do not have internet access but would find it 
easier to receive care via telemedicine to be provided with appropriate 
equipment, much like programmes that provide disadvantaged stu-
dents with laptops. This would be especially useful for patients with 
chronic conditions who have to attend regular consultations.
4.3 | Damage to the clinician– patient relationship
One final objection is that telemedicine might damage the clinician– 
patient relationship. A lack of face- to- face interaction might prevent 
good communication,47 which some worry might negatively affect 
‘trust, empathy, and overall patient outcomes’.48 Miller notes that 
non- verbal signs are important to effective communication, and that 
without them the clinician– patient relationship may be damaged.49 
Non- verbal communication might include ‘voice quality and tone, 
eye contact, gaze, posture, laughter, facial expressions, body posi-
tioning, proximity, touch, activity (e.g. chart reviewing and computer 
usage) and other cues that modify the meaning of verbal utterances 
(e.g. hesitations)’.50 By not meeting a patient in person, a clinician 
may miss these signs. Not only might poorer communication itself 
damage the clinician– patient relationship, but it might result in, for 
example, a misdiagnosis that goes on to damage the relationship. 
Patients’ broader relationship with healthcare systems may also be 
damaged by the fragmentation of care among multiple providers.51
Of course, this does not necessarily have to be the case where 
services are delivered via telemedicine. Sabin and Skimming have 
highlighted several studies that (in the context of telepsychiatry) sug-
gest that clinicians and patients have not found remote consultations 
to impede empathic connection.52 However, it must be acknowl-
edged that some patients will feel that their communication with 
their clinician is hindered. Whereas some would jump at the opportu-
nity to speak to their clinician from the comfort of their own home, 
others may suffer anxiety if forced to do so.53 As such, when provid-
ing care via telemedicine, special care must be taken to ‘convey ap-
propriate social cues to reinforce the therapeutic relationship’.54
Additional training is certainly important to ensure this. In recogni-
tion of the increasing use of telemedicine, it is appropriate for medical 
schools to focus on the differences between bedside manner and tele-
phone manner, and to ensure that clinicians are prepared to build rap-
port and instil necessary trust in their patients in the absence of 
face- to- face contact. Already- qualified clinicians would also benefit 
from further education as telemedical services develop. There remains 
an obligation to provide competent care,55 and specific training can en-
able this.
Beyond highlighting the need for additional training, this final 
objection strengthens my argument that telemedical services ought 
only to be additional services and not replacements. Even with spe-
cific training to minimize, for example, the extent to which remote 
consultations impede good communication, some patients may still 
find it uncomfortable. To force such patients to attend remote con-
sultations would itself damage the clinician– patient relationship, so 
it is important that in- person options remain.
5  | CONCLUSION
Given telemedicine’s potential for improving the healthcare of many, 
it is unsurprising that we are moving towards it. It is important, how-
ever, to consider the harms of the telemedicine rush. This is where 
the TI offers a simple assessment to establish the moral need to 
implement a particular service by telemedical means. Assuming the 
four criteria are met, telemedical provision of a service ought to be 
implemented.
Telemedicine is not a quick fix. I have highlighted ways in which 
it can overcome health inequities, but it cannot alone fix the under-
lying issues. However, telemedicine still has the potential to partially 
bridge the socioeconomic gap in health outcomes, and any money 
saved can— and should— be put towards closing the gap further 
through reaching those telemedicine does not.
Whilst my focus has been on medical practice, there is certainly a 
role for telemedicine in research, which might even increase participa-
tion. Global health, too, stands to benefit, although I have intentionally 
left this out of my discussion owing to the more specific issues that 
arise. For example, legal issues in cross- border telemedicine.56 The TI 
in the global health context needs further discussion as a separate 
issue.
Implementing telemedicine is not without systemic obstacles, 
such as the difficulty of fitting it into routine practice and resistance 
to change.57 Cross- border telemedicine may also prove to be an in-
tranational obstacle in countries such as the United States, where 
certain medical regulation is at the state level.58 Undoubtedly, the 
 46Office for National Statistics. (2019). Internet access – households and individuals, Great 
Britain: 2019. Retrieved from https://www.ons.gov.uk/peopl epopu latio nandc ommun ity/
house holdc harac teris tics/homei ntern etand socia lmedi ausag e/bulle tins/inter netac cessh 
ouseh oldsa ndind ividu als/2019
 47Silverman, R. D. (2003) Current legal and ethical concerns in telemedicine and 
e- medicine. Journal of Telemedicine and Telecare, 9(s1), 67– 69.
 48Bauer, op. cit. note 42, p. 142.
 49Miller E. A. (2003). The technical and interpersonal aspects of telemedicine: Effects on 
doctor– patient communication. Journal of Telemedicine and Telecare, 9(1), 1– 7.
 50Ibid: 3– 4.
 51Dorsey, E. R., & Topol, E. J. (2016). State of telehealth. New England Journal of Medicine, 
375, 154– 161, p. 157.
 52Sabin & Skimming, op. cit. note 36, p. 491.
 53Clarke, P. A., Capuzzi, K., & Harrison, J. (2010). Telemedicine: Medical, legal and ethical 
perspectives. Medical Science Monitor, 16(12), RA261– RA272.
 54Terrasse, M., Gorin, M., & Sisti, D. (2019). Social media, e- health, and medical ethics. 
Hastings Center Report, 49(1), 24– 33, p. 26.
 55Chaet et al., op. cit. note 29, p. 1138.
 56Dickens & Cook, op. cit. note 13.
 57de Bont, A., & Bal, R. (2008). Telemedicine in interdisciplinary work practices: On an IT 
system that met the criteria for success set out by its sponsors, yet failed to become part 
of every- day clinical routines. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, 8, 47
 58Stanberry, op. cit. note 12.
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initial introduction of a telemedical service will encounter minor 
problems. However, this is not reason to deny the TI; it does not 
problematize the fourth criterion. We must pursue the expansion of 
telemedicine both to enhance patient autonomy and to improve 
health outcomes by redressing longstanding inequities.
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